ABSTRACT: This study examines the informational effects of unit of account choices in the context of a proposed standard on lease accounting. Standard-setters have tentatively decided that leases in excess of one year should be recognized on a lessee's balance sheet, including optional lease periods, even though the lessee can choose not to renew the lease. We argue that this approach lacks representational faithfulness and creates an informational problem for users. Using an experiment, we show that the proposed treatment of renewal options has a negative effect on lenders' willingness to lend to a firm with renewal options. However, we also show that disaggregating the capitalized optional renewal periods from the fixed-term lease obligation mitigates some of the negative effects of the proposed approach, particularly when disaggregation occurs on the face of the financial statements. These results should be of interest to standard-setters as they deliberate changes to lease accounting and when considering the trade-offs that can arise with expansive unit of account choices.
I. INTRODUCTION
S tandard-setting involves several difficult decisions and trade-offs (e.g., balancing user demands against preparer costs; choosing recognition versus disclosure; requiring remeasurement rather than systematic allocation), and one of the most challenging decisions is determining whether and how to carve up an economic arrangement. Essentially, standard-setters must decide which aspects of an economic transaction to account for independently and which to consider jointly. This decision is often referred to by standard-setters as a unit of account issue, and it is present in almost every standard-setting project. 1 In particular, many business contracts (such as insurance and leasing contracts) include various sets of potential cash flows, some of which are related and others of which are quite independent from each other. 2 The decision about which cash flows to consider jointly can have a significant impact on the resulting financial reporting. These decisions are all the more difficult because neither the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) nor the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has a clearly defined set of principles within their conceptual framework for deciding unit of account issues.
One particularly troublesome unit of account issue relates to leasing and the issue of off-balance sheet financing. Current rules in U.S. GAAP and IFRS allow leases that meet certain criteria to remain off-balance sheet, showing no asset or liability on the balance sheet and, instead, recording only rental expense each period. The magnitudes of these arrangements are nontrivial. A 2005 SEC study estimated that there are approximately $1.25 trillion in off-balance sheet, non-cancelable lease obligations (SEC 2005) . Put in perspective, this amount is approximately 31 times the amount of obligations currently recognized on issuer balance sheets (Kieso et al. 2008 ). In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that firms frequently use lease renewal options to move part of the underlying lease liability off-balance sheet (Kieso et al. 2008; Hyatt and Reed 2007) .
Currently, U.S. GAAP requires lease renewal options to be factored into the measurement of the lease asset and liability only if exercise of the renewal option is reasonably assured (FASB 2010d, ASC 840-10-25-6) . Because many renewal options fail to meet this criterion, lessees are able to keep significant portions of their likely lease terms off-balance sheet. Ignoring options when accounting for leases is problematic because it invites transaction structuring. For example, under current accounting standards, a fixed-term lease that would otherwise qualify for capitalization because it extends for more than 75 percent of the leased asset's useful life can be rewritten as a lease with a shorter minimum term and options to renew for an equivalent total lease term. Furthermore, eliminating the operating lease classification would not remove the problem because an n-year lease can still be written as a one-year lease with nÀ1 annual options to renew. Thus, ignoring lease options creates a structuring opportunity for preparers.
To address these concerns with off-balance sheet financing, the FASB and the IASB (collectively, the boards) recently proposed that all leases in excess of one year should be recognized as assets and liabilities on a lessee's balance sheet. More importantly, the boards 1 In U.S. GAAP, unit of account is defined as ''That which is being measured by reference to the level at which an asset or liability is aggregated (or disaggregated) '' (FASB 2010e; emphasis added). In other words, of all the cash flows related to an economic arrangement, which should be considered jointly and which should be analyzed separately when thinking about recognition and measurement? In contrast, the question of how to report recognized items is a separate issue of presentation and disclosure. 2 For example, insurance contracts can include fixed and variable premiums, renewal options, acquisition costs, investment returns, and benefits payments. Similarly, leasing contracts can include fixed-term payments, renewal periods, contingent rents, service arrangements, and cancelation privileges.
tentatively decided in the exposure draft of a proposed leasing standard to make the unit of account the ''whole'' leasing contract, which would account for not only the fixed-term lease obligations, but also the optional renewal periods as a single leasing obligation. This proposed treatment essentially treats payments associated with renewal options as present obligations (and treats access to the leased assets as present resources), even though the lessee has not yet exercised its right to renew, nor is the lessee obligated to do so. 3 Although the proposed treatment minimizes structuring opportunities, we argue that this approach lacks representational faithfulness and can lead to problems with comparability. The purpose of this study is to examine how such unit of account choices, like the one tentatively made in the newly proposed standard on lease accounting, are likely to affect decision making.
Drawing on research in psychology, we predict that, by treating options as if they have already been exercised, users are, paradoxically, likely to treat firms with renewal options as if they have less operational flexibility than if they had no renewal options and were, therefore, exposed to the risk of adverse movements in rental rates. In a similar vein, the proposed accounting could also create an apparent difference between firms that are economically equivalent. In other words, we expect the proposed accounting for renewal options to have limited decision usefulness because, by lumping optional renewal periods and the fixed lease term into a single unit of account, it does not faithfully represent the economics inherent in lease renewal options.
In order to test our predictions, we use an experiment to examine how capitalizing optional renewal periods affects lenders' credit decisions. In the experiment, participants are asked to examine a firm that has a fixed-term lease with optional renewal periods and determine whether they would rather lend to this firm or to a similar firm that owns, rather than leases, real estate. We then manipulate whether the fixed term and the optional renewal periods are accounted for as a single unit of account. Thus, participants view financial statements in which the rights and obligations that will be associated with the optional renewal periods, if later exercised, either are or are not added to the present rights and obligations arising from the fixed term of the lease arrangement.
Even though capitalization of optional renewal periods recognizes a symmetric increase in both recorded assets and liabilities, equity stays constant such that this grossing up of the balance sheet can make a firm look more highly leveraged. Drawing on prior research in accounting (e.g., Hopkins 1996; Luft and Shields 2001), we expect participants to be less willing to lend to firms with optional renewal periods when these renewal periods are recognized as part of the firm's total lease liabilities than when these optional renewal periods are merely disclosed.
If lenders fixate on total liabilities when making lending decisions, we also propose and test a potential solution. Recent research has shown that disaggregation can play an important role in how investors and creditors process information (Clor-Proell et al. 2010; Bloomfield et al. 2010 ), and we hypothesize that a similar type of disaggregation could reduce the extent to which lenders treat optional renewal periods the same as fixed lease obligations. For example, by disaggregating capitalized renewal options from capitalized fixed lease terms, lenders can more easily see the impact that these ''what-you-may-call-its'' have on the financial position of the lessee firm and so adjust their calculations of leverage or other credit-related metrics as they see fit (Sprouse 1966) . 3 Although we use the term renewal options throughout the paper in the interest of brevity, many of the same ideas apply to other types of lease options, such as options to cancel a lease. For example, a five-year lease with an option to renew for an additional five years can be structured as an economically identical ten-year lease with the option to cancel after five years. 4 The term ''what-you-may-call-its'' was popularized by Sprouse (1966) and refers to items that do not meet the definition of liabilities, but are nonetheless included on the balance sheet.
To test this prediction, we present a third group of participants with financial statements in which the capitalized lease obligations have been disaggregated into separate categories for non-cancelable lease periods and lease periods subject to renewal at the lessee's discretion. Doing so allows us to test whether disaggregation can overcome much of the informational disadvantage of recognizing lease renewal options as if they were liabilities. Results from our experiment are consistent with our predictions. First, we find that lenders are much less willing to lend to a firm with optional renewal periods when those periods are capitalized on the balance sheet. This result is important because it suggests a significant trade-off in decision usefulness in order to address the concern that preparers will structure around the intent of the proposed leasing standard. More specifically, because optional renewal periods protect lessees (e.g., by allowing them the operational flexibility to move out of a declining business, or to renew at favorable rates in a prospering business), we would expect lenders to be more (not less) willing to lend to a firm with renewal options, ceteris paribus. Importantly, we also find that disaggregating capitalized lease obligations into cancelable and non-cancelable categories on the face of the financial statements eliminates the observed decline in willingness to lend that comes with capitalization of optional renewal periods, suggesting a means for reducing the informational concerns that can arise when choosing a more expansive unit of account.
While alternative means of debiasing user judgments are theoretically possible, we focus on the impact of disaggregation for several reasons. First, from a theoretical perspective, disaggregation, which deals with presentation and disclosure, is a natural way to deal with information issues arising from unit of account choices, which deal with recognition and measurement. Whereas most studies on functional fixation consider the question of recognition versus measurement, few studies have yet tackled unit of account issues, even though this is one of the most challenging and important choices that standard-setters make. Thus, disaggregation has, to date, been studied relatively less often in this literature.
Second, from a practical perspective, disaggregation offers a potential solution that is both feasible and cost effective because firms must already track information related to lease options in order to evaluate which options meet the certainty threshold. As such, disaggregation is also consistent with Bonner's (1999) framework for judgment and decision-making (JDM) research, which emphasizes the importance of examining solutions that can be implemented in practice. In addition, disaggregating optional lease renewal periods from non-cancelable lease periods is consistent with the presentation requirements being considered in the proposed leasing standard and also with a joint project on financial statement presentation that the boards have been considering. As such, our study provides empirical evidence on two current issues on the boards' agendas and highlights the importance of considering these projects jointly during deliberations.
We expect the results of this experiment to inform regulators and standard-setters who have recently proposed significant changes to lease accounting standards and to financial reporting more generally. Because standard-setters are still in the process of finalizing these standards, the results of this study should provide useful information about how lenders use the new measurements of lease obligations when making lending decisions. In other words, our study helps to answer calls for research that bridges the gap between accounting practice and scholarship (Schipper 1994; Krische 2009 ) by providing ex ante insights into likely reactions to proposed policies, thereby helping standard-setters to evaluate trade-offs inherent in difficult policy choices (Kachelmeier and King 2002) .
Section II reviews the current and proposed models for lease accounting and develops directional hypotheses about the effects of the proposed changes. Section III describes the details of our experiment. We present the results of our experiment in Section IV, and Section V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Lease accounting has been the subject of controversy for years, often raising concerns about the abuse of accounting rules (e.g., Acito et al. 2009 ). In particular, lease accounting has long been the poster child for rules-based standards and an open invitation for transaction structuring that comes when standards include bright lines. For example, firms can avoid capitalization by structuring leases so that they extend for just less than 75 percent of the leased asset's useful life, or so that the present value of the rental payments is just less than 90 percent of the leased asset's fair value.
In addition, renewal options are widely used in leasing contracts, and the manner in which options are accounted for can have a material impact on the financial statements of many firms. Consider CKE Restaurants, the owner of the Hardee's and Carl's Jr. chains. In 2004, CKE restated their financial statements because of irregularities with its accounting for lease options. CKE was defining the lease term as the initial lease period plus optional renewal periods when computing amortization expense on leasehold improvements (which reduces periodic amortization expense). However, when evaluating whether the lease should be treated as a capital lease, CKE did not include the optional renewal periods in the lease term. Several other restaurants restated their financial statements soon thereafter for the same reason.
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Because of the significant number of restatements, the SEC issued a clarification in February 2005 relating to the accounting standards pertaining to leases that covered several issues, including the treatment of optional lease renewal periods. The SEC's clarification suggested that, unless lease renewals are ''reasonably assured,'' the optional renewal periods associated with a lease should not be considered while evaluating the lease term. While these events can be viewed as a failure to follow the rules rather than evidence of a problem with the rules per se, they illustrate that restaurant chains make extensive use of options when negotiating property and equipment leases (Kieso et al. 2008) , implying that the accounting for optional renewal periods will have a material impact on these firms' financial statements.
The Proposed Accounting Model
In an effort to address concerns about transaction structuring, the boards have tentatively agreed on an accounting model for leases that would substantially change the accounting for leases. Lessees would recognize (1) an asset representing their right to use the leased item for the lease term (the ''right-of-use'' asset) and (2) a liability for their obligation to pay rentals. 7 Thus, the proposed model would eliminate the notion of an operating lease, forcing all leases to be capitalized.
8 While this proposal would substantially reduce the scope of transaction structuring opportunities, eliminating the operating lease classification does not remove the issue of transaction structuring altogether because an n-year lease could still be written as a one-year lease with nÀ1 annual options to renew. Consequently, the boards have tentatively agreed to include lease periods 6 See Hyatt and Reed (2007) for a list of illustrations and references from the popular press relating to this issue. 7 Lessors would similarly recognize an asset (the right to receive lease payments) and a liability (the obligation to provide access to the leased asset) as long as the lessor retains exposure to significant risks or benefits associated with the leased asset. If the lessor does not retain such exposure, then they would derecognize the leased asset. 8 Note, however, that the issue of whether a contract is a lease at all (as opposed to a service agreement) still remains.
subject to renewal or cancelation as part of the recognized lease asset and lease liability. In other words, components of a lease (options to renew or cancel, purchase options, etc.) would not be recognized separately. In the case of renewal options, the boards have tentatively agreed that preparers would use the longest lease term that is more likely than not to occur when recognizing and measuring the lease asset and obligation.
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The proposed approach, while being much more resistant to structuring opportunities, is not perfect. In particular, by having preparers and auditors treat options as if they have already been exercised, the proposed model raises a number of concerns. The first concern is conceptual. Given the definition of a liability, which is a probable future sacrifice of economic benefits arising from present obligations as a result of past transactions or events, one might reasonably argue that the option to renew a lease in the future does not create a present obligation to pay for that leased asset. For example, consider that firms may plan to continue employing their sales force in future periods, and may do so with near certainty, but that does not create a present obligation for those future salaries, wages, and commissions. Thus, there is a question as to whether the proposed approach faithfully represents the economics inherent in these arrangements.
The second concern is how the proposed approach affects the decision usefulness of the reported lease information. To illustrate, consider the examples in Table 1 . All three examples illustrate how the proposed approach could, unintentionally, impair the decision-usefulness of reported lease information. The example in Panel C, however, differs from the first two examples in one important respect. Whereas the first two examples show how the proposed approach masks substantive differences between economically dissimilar firms, the third example illustrates how the proposed approach makes economically identical firms appear dissimilar. That is, the two firms in the third example differ in exactly one respect-how they account for the renewal periods in their lease. While each of these three scenarios identifies a comparability issue (i.e., the ability ''to identify and understand similarities in, and differences among, items '' [FASB 2010c]), studying a situation like that in Panel C has the appealing property that any difference in judgments across treatments can be attributed to the effect of the accounting treatment for renewal options.
Research on Financial Reporting Presentation Effects
Some may disagree with the concerns we have pointed out in the previous section, arguing that adequate disclosure would allow financial statement users to identify the differences among lease arrangements. However, prior research has shown that individuals tend to fixate on accounting numbers. That is, individuals tend to accept accounting numbers in financial statements without unscrambling the underlying assumptions used in arriving at those numbers (e.g. , Hand 1990; Luft and Shields 2001) . They are also overly affected by where accounting numbers are located in financial statements, holding constant the underlying economics (Hopkins 1996) . To the extent that individuals do not unscramble the assumptions used in arriving at an accounting number, they could inappropriately judge firms that are economically equivalent (except for their choice of accounting alternatives) to be different. 10 9 This can be contrasted with the approach in current U.S. GAAP, which capitalizes payments over the contractual minimum lease term plus any renewal periods that are reasonably certain to be exercised. 10 A recent Deloitte survey of lessees, lessors, and real estate service providers is consistent with some of the concerns we raise. As reported in a press release, ''more than 80 percent of respondents believe that the lease accounting standards will place a significant burden on financial reporting for tenants as well as property owners. More than 40 percent of respondents believe the new standards would make it more difficult to obtain financing. In addition, 68 percent of respondents said it would have a material impact on their debt to equity ratio '' (Deloitte 2011). Two firms, A and B, are identical in all respects with the exception of how they structured their most recent lease arrangement. Firm A signed a one-year lease with no renewal options, and Firm B signed a one-year lease with an option to renew the lease at the end of every year at a pre-determined rate for a total period not to exceed five years. Both firms expect to use their leased assets for five years. Firm A will have to renegotiate the lease every year at, presumably, market rates. Firm B has the option, but not the obligation, to renew at a pre-determined rate, reducing its exposure to adverse market fluctuations in lease rental rates. Nevertheless, by treating the option as if it has already been exercised, Firm B will be required to capitalize five years of lease payments, increasing its debt/ equity ratio and having the paradoxical effect of making Firm B appear as if it posed a greater credit risk to lenders than Firm A because Firm B has the option to renew.
Panel B: Lease with Renewal Options versus a Fixed-Term Lease
Two firms, A and B, are identical in all respects with the exception of how they structured their most recent lease arrangement. Firm A signed a one-year lease with an option to renew the lease at the end of every year at a pre-determined rate for a total period not to exceed five years. Firm B signed a five-year, fixed-term lease. Both firms expect to use their leased assets for five years. Although Firm A faces more uncertainty about future rental rates than does Firm B, the renewal option protects Firm A against adverse movements, and so offers only upside potential. In addition, Firm A has more operational flexibility to scale down operations if customer demand dries up. Having operational flexibility is important because it allows management the opportunity to more effectively deploy the firm's capital if circumstances change, rather than having it tied up in leased assets for years to come. Despite these clear economic differences, the proposed approach fails to convey these differences, and instead treats the two leases the same.
Panel C: Lease Renewal Options Capitalized versus Not Capitalized
Two firms, A and B, are identical in all respects with the exception of how they accounted for their renewal options. Both Firm A and B signed a one-year lease with an option to renew the lease at the end of every year at a pre-determined rate for a total period not to exceed five years. Both firms anticipate that they will use their leased assets for five years. Firm A operates in a regime that does not require renewal options to be capitalized unless they are reasonably certain that the options will be exercised. Consequently, Firm A does not capitalize their renewal options. Firm B, however, operates in a regime that requires renewal options to be capitalized if the options are more likely than not to be exercised. Therefore, Firm B capitalizes the renewal periods in their lease. Consequently, Firm B's solvency ratios (e.g. debt-to-equity ratio) appear worse compared to Firm A. Although the two firms are economically equivalent, the differential accounting treatment makes Firm B's solvency ratios appear worse when compared to Firm A.
Presentation effects such as these appear to be a relatively robust phenomenon, in that they have been documented for a number of different financial reporting items among both more-and less-sophisticated investors.
11 For example, Hopkins (1996) finds that buy-side analysts are misled by differential accounting classification of economically identical securities. Maines and McDaniel (2000) find that investors' assessments of (economically equivalent) comprehensive income vary based on accounting-standard-based, presentation-format differences. In an earlier study on comprehensive income, Hirst and Hopkins (1998) find that buy-side analysts differentially assess the likelihood of earnings management for economically identical circumstances. In related research, Hirst et al. (2004) find that the risk and valuation judgments of bank analysts are affected by how banks measure income, holding constant the underlying economics and information available to the analysts.
Related effects have also been documented in recognition versus disclosure-type situations, wherein investors appear to view recognized values as different from disclosed values (Harper et al. 1987; Davis-Friday et al. 1999; Davis-Friday et al. 2004; Ahmed et al. 2006) . 12 Whether this behavior is irrational, however, is debatable. Although recognition versus disclosure need not, in theory, alter the fundamental economic properties of the recognized/disclosed item, in practice there may be important differences between items that have been recognized in the financial statements, rather than merely disclosed. In particular, Libby et al. (2006) show that the decision to disclose versus recognize can reduce information reliability because auditors are more likely to require correction of misstatements in recognized amounts than when those same amounts are only disclosed. Presentation effects have also been documented in the context of segment-reporting (Maines et al. 1997 ) and accounting for intangibles (Luft and Shields 2001) .
Although research in this area has not yet identified a comprehensive theory of why people fixate on accounting information and are susceptible to format effects, Maines and McDaniel (2000) present what Libby et al. (2002, 784) refer to as, ''the beginnings of a theory of format effects. '' In particular, Maines and McDaniel (2000) list five factors that affect the degree to which investors will rely on a particular disclosure in assessments of corporate performance: (1) placement, (2) labeling as income, (3) linkage to net income, (4) isolation, and (5) degree of aggregation.
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In the context of leasing, we believe placement, labeling, and aggregation are particularly relevant. In particular, when standards require preparers to capitalize optional renewal periods, we expect that the bundling of a renewal period together with the fixed portion of a lease obligation will cause users to treat firms with options as if the options have already been exercised. The literature on presentation effects suggests that users will not demarcate the renewal periods from the original lease term. Even though capitalization recognizes a symmetric increase in both the assets and liabilities recognized on the balance sheet, equity stays constant, such that this grossing up of the balance sheet will generally make a firm look more highly leveraged. Therefore, we expect 11 Libby et al. (2002) use the term ''format effects'' synonymously with ''functional fixation, '' whereas Libby et al. (2006) refer to ''information location research. '' 12 It is important to note that, while information located in a less accessible location can limit the extent to which user judgments are affected by that information, research by Nelson and Tayler (2007) indicates that, in the process of transforming financial statements to look as if the information were located in a more accessible location, users are ultimately more affected by that information than if it had been made more accessible from the start. 13 These five factors can potentially influence information acquisition, evaluation, and/or weighting. Maines and McDaniel (2000) provide experimental evidence that, in the context of other comprehensive income items, users notice the unrealized gains and losses (UGLs) and are aware of whether the volatility for those items is high or low in all conditions, but weight the UGL information differentially as a function of location. Their results suggest that presentation effects are driven by weighting, rather than acquisition and evaluation. In contrast, Hewitt (2009) argues that the earnings forecasting effects he documents are due to insufficient acquisition (what information they use) and processing (how they use it).
participants to be less willing to lend to firms with optional renewal periods when these renewal periods are capitalized as part of the firm's total lease liabilities than when these optional renewal periods are merely disclosed. This leads to our first prediction:
H1: Lenders are less willing to lend to firms that report optional lease renewal periods as liabilities than to firms that do not report their optional lease renewal periods as liabilities.
Support for H1 would demonstrate that using the proposed approach to address concerns about transaction structuring creates an unintended information effect-namely, that firms will have a more difficult time borrowing money from creditors and lenders. This trade-off arises, in part, because the proposed accounting method is not representationally faithful. In our opinion, the obligation to pay rentals in an optional period fails to meet the definition of a liability and so would be reminiscent of the ''what-you-may-call-its '' identified by Sprouse (1966) in some pre-FASB standards. We believe that options associated with a lease are more likely to meet the definition of an asset and that the conceptually correct approach would be to adopt a components approach that distinguishes the options from the underlying lease. Such an approach, which would break the lease arrangement up into various smaller units of account, is, however, viewed by the boards as not pragmatic because of the various valuation issues associated with valuing lease options (Joint IASB/FASB Meeting 2009).
Improving the Decision Usefulness of the Proposed Approach
Given the decisions of the boards to this point, we next consider ways to mitigate the effect we expect in H1. If users fixate on total debt as presented on the balance sheet, it could be because of an aggregation problem. In other words, users might want to treat optional renewal periods differently than fixed renewal periods, but fail to realize that the total lease liability on the balance sheet includes optional renewal periods because both items are aggregated together on the face of the balance sheet (and they fail to incorporate fully information contained in the footnotes). If so, then one way to mitigate the effect we expect in H1 is to disaggregate recognized lease liabilities into lease obligations relating to fixed and optional renewal periods. These disaggregated amounts can be labeled to indicate that the amounts associated with the renewal periods are optional at the lessee's discretion, consistent with Maines and McDaniel (2000) , whose framework suggests that disaggregation and labeling are two important cognitive dimensions that impact how investors weigh information.
In a constructive lease capitalization setting, Nelson and Tayler (2007) show that information contained in an operating lease has a greater effect on judgments when participants expend effort to obtain that information and transform the financial statements to include unrecognized fixed-term lease periods in their analysis. Our setting essentially presents participants with the reverse situation, wherein they must exert cognitive effort if they wish to adjust financial statements for the optional renewal periods that have been capitalized. If disaggregation and labeling are sufficient to make the information about optional renewal periods salient so that participants can treat them differently than fixed lease obligations, then the findings of Nelson and Tayler (2007) would suggest that the information about renewal options would likely have the strongest effect on participants in the capitalized and disaggregated condition.
While the disaggregation solution proposed above could potentially address the information effect created by the proposed unit of account choice, a second possibility is that recognizing the lease payments associated with optional periods as present obligations is sufficient to cause users to treat these potential payments as liabilities. This could be the case if, for example, users believe that the accounting rules offer the correct treatment of leases for their investment and credit decisions. If so, disaggregation and labeling would have little impact on users' decisions, as they do not alter the underlying treatment in the proposed approach, which is to classify certain optional renewal periods as a liability.
To address the question of whether disaggregation and labeling are sufficient to mitigate the effects of H1, we examine a condition in which lease periods subject to renewal options are identified and capitalized, but presented separately from non-cancelable lease periods on the face of the balance sheet. This leads to our second prediction:
H2: Lenders are more willing to lend to firms that report lease renewal periods as liabilities when optional renewal periods are reported on the balance sheet separately from lease periods not subject to renewal or cancelation.
Although our proposed solution offers the opportunity to test a portion of the theory proposed by Maines and McDaniel (2000) , we also focus on our proposed solution for two additional reasons. First, disaggregation offers a potential solution that is practical and cost effective because firms already track information related to lease options in order to evaluate which options meet the certainty threshold, making our proposal consistent with Bonner (1999) , who emphasizes the importance of examining solutions that can be implemented in practice. Second, disaggregating lease renewal periods from non-cancelable lease periods is consistent with the presentation requirements being considered in the proposed leasing standard and also with a more general change that is being proposed in a separate joint project on financial statement presentation.
Currently, the boards are working on a joint project on financial statement presentation, which would require additional disaggregation of information throughout the financial statements. One of the key principles espoused in this project relating to disaggregation is that an entity should disaggregate items in the financial statements based on the function, nature, and measurement basis of these items. With respect to the disaggregation by nature, the boards have tentatively decided that ''nature'' refers to ''economic characteristics or attributes that distinguish assets, liabilities, income and expense items, and cash flows that do not respond equally to similar economic events, such as wholesale revenues and retail revenues; materials, labor, transportation and energy costs; or fixedincome investments and equity investments '' (FASB 2010a, 11).
In the context of accounting for leases, disaggregating the fixed term of the lease and the optional term would be consistent with disaggregation by nature because the two obligations (or potential obligations) are likely to respond differently to changes in lease rental rates. Therefore, the spirit of the disaggregation principle outlined in the financial statement presentation project suggests that lease renewal options be demarcated and presented separately from lease periods that are not subject to renewal or cancelation.
In addition, the lease project is directly considering how to disclose lease obligations. In that project, the boards have not suggested a disaggregation of optional renewal periods per se. However, the boards have indicated that an entity ''shall disclose quantitative and qualitative financial information that: (a) identifies and explains the amounts recognized in the financial statements arising from leases; and (b) describes how leases may affect the amount, timing, and uncertainty of the entity's future cash flows. '' (FASB 2010b, } 70)
With respect to disaggregation, the boards have tentatively decided on the following guidance:
An entity shall aggregate or disaggregate disclosures so that useful information is not obscured by either the inclusion of a large amount of insignificant detail or the aggregation of items that have different characteristics. (FASB 2010b, } 71) We argue that separate presentation of lease liabilities that arise from optional renewal periods would be consistent with this guidance. In this regard, evidence on the decision usefulness of disaggregation of lease obligations by nature provides important feedback to the boards on both the lease project and the financial statement presentation project.
III. METHOD Experimental Design and Overview
In our experiment, participants in all treatment conditions are provided with selected data from two firms' financial statements, including some common metrics used in loan agreements. Data relating to the first firm are identical across experimental conditions. For the second firm, we manipulate whether optional renewal periods of a lease are capitalized and, if so, whether the amount is combined in a single line with the fixed portion of the lease term or is presented on a separate line, resulting in a 1 3 3 experimental design (renewal options not capitalized; renewal options capitalized and aggregated; renewal options capitalized and disaggregated). Participants in all treatment conditions indicate which one of the two firms they will lend to, based on the information provided to them. Because we hold the underlying economics of the two firms constant across conditions, any differences in participants' lending decisions across treatment conditions must be attributed to the variation in the accounting for and reporting of lease renewal options across conditions.
Participants
Forty-two master's students from a large state university were recruited by in-class announcements for participation in this experiment. Thirty-six of these participants were M.B.A. students who had completed their core financial accounting courses. The remaining six were students in a Master of Quantitative and Computational Finance program and had completed coursework that dealt with leases. On average, participants were 28.4 years of age (S.D. ¼ 3.25 years) and had 5.25 years of full-time work experience (S.D. ¼ 3.14 years). Neither age nor work experience differs significantly by condition. Participants took, on average, approximately 20 minutes to complete the materials, which were administered to them in an experimental laboratory. Participants did not receive any compensation for their participation.
Because professionals lenders represent a costly subject pool (Libby et al. 2002) , we chose to use master's students to test our hypotheses. M.B.A. students have often been used in the past to proxy for nonprofessional investors and, while this design choice has been subject to criticism, Elliott et al. (2007) provide evidence that using M.B.A. students to proxy for nonprofessional investors is a valid methodological choice, provided researchers match a task's integrative complexity with the appropriate level of M.B.A. student. In a similar vein, we argue that our M.B.A. students, with their significant full-time work experience and completed coursework, are a reasonable proxy for many of the lenders who will be affected by the proposed leasing standard (e.g., nonprofessional investors in the bond market, lenders at local community banks, and other small business commercial lenders). We return to this issue of our experimental design again in the conclusion when we discuss some of the limitations of our study.
Experimental Procedures and Dependent Variable
In a paper-and-pencil task, participants read and evaluated information about two firms. Participants were informed that the two firms were regional wholesale and distribution firms, located in the same geographical area, and facing similar economic circumstances. The sole difference between the two firms was the means by which they acquired the use of their primary warehouses and distribution hubs. Participants learned that the first firm (hereafter, the benchmark firm) acquired the use of its warehouses and distribution hubs by purchasing them with a mortgage. The second firm (hereafter, the lessee firm) acquired the use of its warehouses and distribution hubs through lease agreements. The mortgage and lease agreement were described briefly, and summary financial information was provided for both firms. The financial information consisted of excerpts from the financial statements and five metrics commonly used in bank loan covenants (Dyreng 2009 ), including debt-to-equity, EBITDA, debt-to-EBITDA, EBIT, and interest coverage (measured as EBIT/interest). See Appendix A for illustrations of the specific financial information provided in each of our treatments.
For our dependent measure, participants, in the role of prospective lenders, indicated which of the two firms they would be more willing to lend to. In order to increase the power of our tests, we made two design choices. First, after studying the financial information, but before making their lending decision, participants were asked to assess the lessee firm's vulnerability to default relative to the benchmark firm. We used a nine-point scale, with the lowest point on the scale labeled ''Much less vulnerable'' and the highest point on this scale labeled ''Much more vulnerable. '' 14 This question was intended to reinforce the effect that our manipulations had on participants' risk assessments and to help ensure that their lending decisions would be impacted by their assessment of default risk.
15 Second, consistent with the findings of Altamuro et al. (2011) , who find that adjusting for off-balance sheet lease obligations is more important for unsecured loans than for secured loans, we asked participants to make their lending decision in the context of making an unsecured loan to one of the two firms.
After making their lending decision, participants provided an explanation of the primary factor(s) that affected their response. To gain additional insight into participants' lending decisions, we asked participants to respond to questions indicating (1) the specific terms of the lease information they received for the lessee firm, and (2) how the lease affected the balance sheet of the lessee firm. Participants also provided an assessment of the importance of various ratios and factors in making their lending decision. Scale endpoints ranged from 0, denoting ''no influence,'' to 7, denoting ''significant influence.'' Finally, we obtained demographic information about participants to ensure that participant profiles across treatment conditions were comparable.
Treatment Conditions
All information in the experimental materials was identical except for the information about the lessee firm's lease agreement. Participants were provided a summary income statement and a balance sheet for the benchmark firm (which had no leases because it had decided to purchase its warehouse and distribution hubs rather than lease them) and for the lessee firm. The information describing the lessee firm's lease agreement was as follows:
Information common to all conditions (describing the lease period and the renewal options): Company S leases all four of these facilities . . . Company S is obligated to pay $4 million for each of the first three years, after which Company S has the option to extend the lease at $4 million per year, one year at a time for up to an additional seven years.
Treatment Condition 1 (Renewal options not capitalized): Applicable accounting rules require Company S to ''capitalize'' the three-year lease agreement on its balance sheet . . . One year into this lease, the lease liability is measured at $7,133,059, which is the discounted value of the two remaining contractual lease payments. Treatment Condition 2 (Renewal options capitalized and aggregated): Applicable accounting rules require Company S to ''capitalize'' the three-year lease agreement and all seven renewal periods on its balance sheet . . . One year into this lease, the lease liability is measured at $24,987,552, which is the discounted value of the nine remaining contractual and optional lease payments. Treatment Condition 3 (Renewal options capitalized and disaggregated): Applicable accounting rules require Company S to ''capitalize'' the three-year lease agreement and all seven renewal periods on its balance sheet . . . One year into this lease, the lease liability is measured at $24,987,552, which is the discounted value of the two remaining contractual lease payments ($7,133,059) and the seven remaining optional lease payments ($17,854,493) .
Summary financial information included a condensed income statement and balance sheet for the benchmark firm (held constant across conditions) and the lessee firm (held constant across conditions with the exception of how the renewal options were treated as indicated in the previous paragraph). We should also note that, for the financial metrics provided with the financial statements, we followed the accounting treatment assumed in each condition. Therefore, leverage for the lessee firm was identical in Conditions 2 and 3 but was higher in those conditions than in Condition 1. While providing these metrics and basing their calculation on the accounting categorization likely increased the probability that we would find support for H1, similar reasoning implies that this design choice would make finding support for H2 less likely.
In this design, a comparison of lending decisions in the ''Renewal options not capitalized'' and the ''Renewal options capitalized and aggregated'' conditions shows the impact of capitalizing optional lease periods. The only difference between the two conditions is that the first condition exempts renewal options from the capitalization requirement, while the second condition requires it. 16 Next, a comparison of lending decisions in the ''Renewal options capitalized and aggregated'' condition and the ''Renewal options capitalized and disaggregated'' condition shows the impact of alternative presentation formats, holding constant the requirement to capitalize optional lease periods. The only difference between these two conditions is that the first condition does not distinguish between ''fixed'' and ''optional'' periods in presenting financial information relating to the lease, while the second condition does. Finally, a comparison of the decision in ''Renewal options not capitalized'' and the ''Renewal options capitalized and disaggregated'' conditions reveals whether disaggregated presentation of the overall lease liability enables participants to reverse the presentation effects that arise when capitalizing renewal periods. In other words, if participants' lending decisions across these two conditions do not significantly differ, then that would suggest that disaggregation enhances comparability by helping participants to treat the lessee firm similarly in economically equivalent conditions. 16 Participants in all conditions are informed that the renewal options are more likely than not to be exercised.
Current regulations require that the exercise of renewal options be ''reasonably assured'' before capitalizing them. Therefore, under the current standards, the lease options described in our case material would not be capitalized. Proposed standards, however, require that renewal options that are ''more likely than not'' to be exercised should be capitalized. Therefore, our first two treatment conditions-''Renewal options not capitalized'' and the ''Renewal options capitalized and aggregated''-can be viewed as corresponding to the current and proposed rules governing the capitalization of renewal options.
IV. RESULTS

Hypotheses Tests
Our primary dependent variable measures which of the two firms (the benchmark or lessee firm) participants are willing to lend to in our three treatment conditions. Figure 1 and Table 2 contain participants' lending decisions across the three treatment conditions. As illustrated in Figure  1 , the number of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm is 77 percent when lease renewal options are not capitalized, 47 percent when lease renewal options are capitalized and aggregated with other lease liabilities, and 79 percent when lease renewal options are capitalized and disaggregated from other lease liabilities, consistent with our predictions, as discussed next.
H1 predicts that, ceteris paribus, participants (in their role as lenders) are less willing to lend to a firm that capitalizes renewal periods in a lease compared to a firm that does not. On average, 77 percent of participants are willing to lend to the lessee firm when renewal periods in a lease are not capitalized and aggregated. However, only 47 percent of participants are willing to lend to the lessee firm when renewal periods in a lease are capitalized and aggregated. As shown in Table 3 , a
FIGURE 1 Percentage of Participants Choosing to Lend to the Lessee Firm
This figure displays the percentage of participants in each condition who said they would rather lend to the firm that was leasing property (the lessee firm) than to the comparison firm that had no leases (the benchmark firm). The only difference across conditions is how the optional renewal periods were accounted for. In the ''Renewal Options Not Capitalized'' condition, the lease information was presented in the notes accompanying the financial statements, but only the fixed term of the lease was capitalized. In the ''Renewal Options Capitalized and Aggregated'' condition, the capitalized lease obligation included the optional renewal periods and was reported as a single line item on the balance sheet. In the ''Renewal Options Capitalized and Disaggregated'' condition, the capitalized lease obligation was disaggregated into two line items on the balance sheet-one reflecting the fixed portion of the lease contract and one reflecting the optional renewal periods.
comparison of the proportion of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm under the two conditions reveals that the 30 percent decrease in willingness to lend is statistically significant (z ¼ À1.63, p ¼ 0.05), supporting H1.
17
H2 predicts that, ceteris paribus, participants (in their role as lenders) are more willing to lend to a firm that capitalizes renewal periods in a lease when the reporting firm disaggregates the lease liability into fixed and optional components, as compared to a firm that aggregates the two components. As shown in Figure 1 , 79 percent of participants are willing to lend to the lessee firm when the liability corresponding to renewal periods in a lease is clearly demarcated from the lease liability arising from the fixed periods in a lease. As shown in Table 3 , a comparison of the proportion This table provides the percentage of participants choosing to lend to the benchmark firm or the lessee firm by treatment condition. The benchmark firm has no leases and acquires the use of its distribution facilities by a purchase. The lessee firm acquires the use of its distribution facilities by a lease that comprises both a fixed period and optional renewal periods. For a detailed description of the three treatment conditions, see Figure 1 . This table provides a planned comparison of participants' lending decisions between conditions. H1 compares condition 2 with condition 1. H2 compares condition 3 with condition 2. For a detailed description of the three treatment conditions, see Figure 1 . p-values are one-tailed reflecting the directional nature of the hypotheses.
17 Because of our directional hypotheses, all reported p-values are one-tailed unless otherwise indicated. Because we are comparing proportions, we use the z-statistic (Hicks 1993, 32-33) . The z-test for two independent proportions is equivalent to the Chi-square test, which is itself a non-directional test for the equality of two proportions obtained from independent samples (Sheskin 2004, 511-512) .
of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm under the two conditions reveals that the 32 percent increase in willingness to lend is statistically significant (z ¼ 1.77, p ¼ 0.04), supporting H2. As a follow-up to our tests of H2, we also examine whether there is a difference in willingness to lend between the renewal-options-not-capitalized condition and the renewal-options-capitalizedand-disaggregated condition to test whether there is any difference in participants' willingness to lend to a firm that capitalizes renewal periods in a lease and then disaggregates the lease liability into fixed and optional components as compared to a firm that does not capitalize renewal periods in a lease. The difference between these two conditions (2 percent difference in willingness to lend) is not statistically significant (z ¼ 0.10, p ¼ 0.92, two-tailed, untabulated) , suggesting that the disaggregation of optional and non-cancelable portions of a lease is effective in mitigating the information loss that arises when optional renewal periods are capitalized and aggregated with other lease liabilities.
Supplemental Analyses
Next, we conduct additional analyses to better understand what is driving the effects that financial reporting has on lending decisions in our experiment. Hewitt (2009) identifies differences in information acquisition as one possible explanation for presentation and location effects. Alternatively, the effects we observe could arise during the evaluation and weighting stage of information processing, such that investors acquire information about capitalized renewal periods, independent of the accounting treatment, but then treat renewal periods differently as a function of how accounting rules categorize the payments associated with these periods.
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To shed light on the process by which these presentation effects arise, we asked participants during debriefing to recall the terms of the lessee's lease arrangement. Participants were allowed to present an open-ended response to this question. All but one participant indicated that the lease had both fixed and renewal periods, suggesting that the participants extracted enough information to understand the basic lease arrangement. Thus, there is little evidence that the effect of disaggregation acts through facilitating an understanding of the contractual lease arrangement.
Next, we consider the relationship between participants' assessments of default risk and their lending decisions to better understand what happens during the evaluation and weighting stage of information processing. All else equal, we would expect a positive correlation between assessments of relative creditworthiness and lending decisions. As expected, these assessments are highly correlated with participants' lending decisions across conditions (r ¼ 0.64, p , 0.01) and in each individual condition (p , 0.05 in each condition). Interestingly, this correlation is (at least nominally) highest when renewal periods are not capitalized and is lowest when renewal periods are capitalized and disaggregated (see Figure 2) . to these metrics. Participants answered questions relating to eight metrics. 20 Results of a factor analysis of these responses (untabulated) suggest that these eight metrics are captured by two distinct underlying factors: six of the metrics load on what we characterize as ''financial factors,'' and two load on what we characterize as ''nonfinancial factors. '' 21 Even though we do not see differences in the extent to which participants understood the economic terms of the contractual lease arrangement, disaggregation might make the optional renewal periods (and their accounting) salient, as compared to when they are capitalized and aggregated. If so, then we would expect to see this reflected either in increased importance given to the nonfinancial measures, decreased importance to the financial measures (which include obligations that do not meet the definition of a liability), or both.
As shown in Table 4 , disaggregation of capitalized renewal periods increases the weight participants give to nonfinancial measures (p ¼ 0.05) without significantly altering the weight given to financial measures (p ¼ 0.31). The weight given to both sets of items in the capitalized-anddisaggregated condition does not differ from the weight participants assign to them when the renewal
FIGURE 2 Correlation between Assessments of Creditworthiness and Lending Decisions
This figure displays the correlation between participants' assessment of the relative creditworthiness of the lessee firm and their decision to lend to the lessee firm. For a detailed description of the three treatment conditions, see Figure 1 . 20 Participants record the extent to which their lending decisions were influenced by the following metrics for the two companies (1) debt-to-equity ratio; (2) EBITDA; (3) debt/EBITDA; (4) EBIT; (5) interest coverage (EBIT/ interest); (6) operating cash flow; (7) exposure to changing real estate conditions; and (8) operational flexibility of each company to respond to changing business conditions. The first six items reflect ''financial'' factors and the remaining two reflect ''nonfinancial'' factors. 21 The weight on debt-to-equity ratio loaded on both factors, but computing Cronbach's alpha for both factors strongly suggests that the debt-to-equity ratio coheres with the ''financial'' factor rather than the ''nonfinancial'' factor. More specifically, Cronbach's alpha for the financial factor is virtually unaltered after including the debtto-equity ratio (0.83 to 0.81). In contrast, including the debt-to-equity ratio in the nonfinancial factor decreases the Cronbach's alpha for this factor from 0.88 to 0.13.
options are not capitalized. Thus, the presentation effects we observe appear to be linked in part to the weight that participants give to nonfinancial factors arising from the contractual lease arrangement.
To further explore this relationship, we conduct a mediation analysis. 22 In this analysis, we use disaggregation of the lease liability as the independent variable, participants' lending decision as the dependent variable, and the importance assigned to nonfinancial factors as the mediating variable (Baron and Kenny 1986) . 23 As shown in Figure 3 , the importance assigned to nonfinancial factors fully mediates the relationship between disaggregation and lending decisions. Thus, when lenders place importance on nonfinancial factors, such as exposure to rental rate fluctuations and operational flexibility, they are more likely to lend to the lessee firm, regardless of how the lease obligation is presented. However, disaggregating the capitalized renewal periods increases the extent to which lenders emphasize these nonfinancial factors, which helps explain the increase in lending in this condition.
Evidence on Lending Decisions when Disaggregation Occurs Only in the Notes
Our capitalized and disaggregated condition (Condition 3) breaks out the fixed and the optional components of the lease liability in both the financial statement and the notes accompanying the financial statement. We chose this approach to increase the likelihood that participants would attend to the disaggregation manipulation, allowing us to create a more powerful design for testing whether disaggregation of the capitalized lease obligation increases lending rates. As a result, however, we are unable to determine whether participants are reacting to the disaggregation of information in the notes, in the financial statements, or both.
While a number of prior studies examine the issue of recognition versus disclosure, only a few directly address the issue of information location, holding constant the decision to recognize an item in the financial statements. For example, Clor-Proell et al. (2010) show that disaggregating fair value information on the face of the income statement can affect investors' information processing, but their design does not manipulate the location of this disaggregated information. In contrast, Bloomfield et This table provides participants' mean assessments of the importance they gave to financial and nonfinancial factors when deciding whether to lend to the benchmark firm or the lessee firm. In particular, participants were asked to rate the extent to which eight metrics influenced their decision to lend to the benchmark firm or the lessee firm. Scale endpoints ranged from ''0'' denoting ''no influence'' to ''7'' denoting ''significant influence.'' A factor analysis of the eight metrics (principal components analysis with varimax rotation) indicates two underlying factors. We label the first set of metrics ''financial'' factors (i.e., the debt-to-equity ratio, EBITDA, debt/EBITDA, EBIT, interest coverage, and operating cash flow). We label the remaining two metrics ''nonfinancial'' factors (i.e., exposure to changing real estate conditions and operational flexibility). For a detailed description of the three treatment conditions, see Figure 1 . 22 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this helpful analysis. 23 Given that our mediator is a continuous variable whereas our independent and dependent variables are dichotomous, we follow the procedures outlined in MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) to adjust the conventional test for mediation outlined in Barron and Kinney (1986). al. (2010) manipulate where additional disaggregation and classification take place-either in the notes or on the face of the financial statements. They show that disaggregation and classification only in the notes can be a reasonable substitute for disaggregation and classification on the face. Given that the Proposed Accounting Standards Update (FASB 2010b) for the leasing project only requires disaggregation in the notes, we designed a supplemental condition that replicates the capitalized/disaggregated condition with the exception that the capitalized lease obligation is disaggregated in the notes only and not on the face of the financial statements. All other aspects of the instructions and the experimental stimuli were identical to the original capitalized and disaggregated condition. We then recruited an additional 13 participants with demographic characteristics similar to the participants in our original experiment.
Several interesting findings appear in the results from this supplemental condition. First, the percentage of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm lies between the two capitalization percentages from our first experiment. More specifically, we find that 54 percent of participants are willing to lend to the lessee firm when the disaggregation occurs in the notes, as compared to the 47 percent willing to lend to the lessee firm when the renewal options were capitalized and aggregated with the rest of the lease obligation (z ¼ 0.38, p ¼ 0.35).
24 Second, we find that the number of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm when disaggregation occurs in the notes (54 percent) is significantly less than the 79 percent of participants willing to lend to the lessee firm when the capitalized lease obligation is disaggregated on the face and in the notes (z ¼ À1.36, p ¼ 0.09). These results tentatively suggest that disaggregation in the notes alone is insufficient to explain the differences in lending decisions we observe in our test of H2, providing evidence that participants may have paid more attention to information recognized in the financial statements when making their lending decision.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine how the FASB/IASB proposal to account for lease renewal options is likely to affect lending decisions. In the most recent FASB/IASB exposure draft, the boards have proposed that lease renewal periods included in the longest term more likely than not to occur should be capitalized and recognized as part of total lease assets and liabilities. Although this treatment is likely to reduce the opportunities for preparers to structure lease arrangements to avoid balance sheet recognition, treating lease renewal options as present obligations is inconsistent with the boards' conceptual definition of liabilities, and it potentially puts financial statement users at an informational disadvantage because they cannot distinguish present obligations from those that can be avoided.
The results of our study indicate that participants were less willing to lend to firms that were required to capitalize lease renewal options than to firms that were not required to capitalize renewal options. This finding suggests that participants focused inordinately on the total capitalized lease obligation as presented on the face of the financial statements, ignoring or paying little attention to the fact that a portion of this capitalized amount does not represent a present obligation. The results of our study also indicate that, when capitalized lease renewal options were presented separately from non-cancelable lease liabilities, participants were just as likely to lend to the lessee as they were in a situation where the lessee did not have to capitalize lease renewal options. This finding suggests that disaggregation of the lease liability according to the differing nature of lease obligations can help users overcome the informational disadvantage of capitalizing optional lease periods, while still guarding against transaction structuring that might occur if lease renewal periods were ignored completely.
This study makes a number of important contributions. First, it contributes to the existing literature on functional fixation and presentation effects by documenting these effects in a new and important setting and by providing insight into what drives these effects. In so doing, this study also provides useful input to the boards in their ongoing deliberations relating to lease accounting and, more generally, relating to unit of account choices, which are ubiquitous in accounting. This study indicates that disaggregation of capitalized lease renewal options from capitalized non-cancelable lease obligations provides decision useful information for lending decisions. Interestingly, the decision usefulness arising from disaggregation does not appear to act through highlighting the nature of the underlying contract because all of our participants seemed to understand that the lease contract contained both fixed and optional renewal periods. Instead, as evidenced by our mediation analysis, the effect of disaggregating capitalized optional renewal periods acts by altering the importance that lenders place on nonfinancial factors. In contrast, the importance lenders place on financial factors remains relatively unchanged by disaggregation.
Our study also provides input to the boards on their financial statement presentation project, which proposes that ''the additional information provided by disaggregating information according to function, nature, and measurement basis can assist users in understanding an entity's financial position and performance, and in predicting future cash flows '' (FASB 2010a, } BC66). The study provides evidence that disaggregating the proposed lease measurement into amounts that are unavoidable and those that are avoidable helps lenders assess the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows, especially when this disaggregation takes place on the face of the financial statements.
However, it is not obvious that the boards would opt to require disclosure on the face, as we propose. This is, in part, because doing so, while arguably being decision useful given their tentative unit of account decision of how to include optional renewal periods in the measurement of the total lease liability, would make salient the recognition of obligations that may not meet the definition of a liability (i.e., ''what-you-may-call-its''). Nevertheless, we believe our findings (like other ex ante research) will be useful in helping the boards to make these sorts of difficult unit of account choices that often arise during deliberations. In particular, we do so by showing how disaggregation can be used to address informational issues arising from an expansive unit of account choice.
As with all research, it is important to consider potential limitations of this study. One potential limitation is that, while our participants have a significant amount of full-time work experience, they are not currently working as lenders. In addition, participants received no compensation for their decisions. Although professional work experience as a lender or as a credit analyst might mitigate the magnitude of the effects we document, we have no reason to expect that the directional nature of our predictions would change with different participants. Similar reasoning applies to the likely influence of monetary incentives on lending decisions. Nevertheless, future research might examine the extent to which different types of professional experience and/or incentive structures could alter the effects that we document in the present study.
